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1.Introduction 
Transition probabilities between different credit ratings play a crucial role in any rating-
based credit portfolio model. The difficulty faced by analysts wishing to estimate such 
probabilities for particular types of obligor, however, is the lack of data. If one is 
prepared to assume that the same transition probabilities hold for any type of obligor, 
then one may employ the substantial data sets of ratings histories published by the two 
primary rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The Moody’s dataset, for 
example, includes approximately 60,000 yearly ratings observations if one pools the 
data for all the individual obligors covered by Moody’s since 1970. 
 
However, the Moody’s data, like that of Standard and Poor’s, is heavily weighted, in 
the pre-1990 period, towards US industrials.  Post-1990, the agencies have rated large 
numbers of obligors from other countries, but the majority of these have been banks or 
financials. If one’s primary interest is in a specific group of obligors (examples might 
be European industrials or emerging market sovereigns), the number of annual 
observations of rating transitions available is quite small. The problem is particularly 
great if one wishes to estimate transition probabilities for low credit quality issuers in 
such specific categories since, outside the US, rating agencies primarily rate high credit 
quality issuers. 
 
This paper shows how one may estimate transition probabilities for an important class 
of obligors, namely sovereign issuers. Sovereign transition matrices are widely used in 
credit portfolio modelling and in calculating future loss distributions for pricing 
purposes. The techniques we develop allow one to combine the relatively small amount 
of transition data available for sovereigns with information on sovereign defaults for a 
broader set of countries and over a longer period of time. 
 
More precisely, our approach consists of modelling sovereign defaults and Standard 
and Poor’s sovereign ratings within a common Maximum Likelihood, ordered probit 
framework. The credit standing of any given obligor in a given year is assumed to be 
governed by a latent variable consisting of a random error plus an index, Xβ, of current 
and lagged macroeconomic variables including measures of indebtedness. 
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When no rating is available, the likelihood for a given sovereign is based on whether 
that sovereign is in default or not. When a rating is available, the likelihood consists of 
the probability that the sovereign is in the rating category observed. Use of this 
common framework enables us to pool information from rated and non-rated 
sovereigns in different years. 
 
Having estimated our model, we employ it to predict which rating category each 
obligor would have occupied for each year of our sample. Using the “fitted” rating 
histories generated in this way, we estimate rating transition matrices. The number of 
observations of forecast rating transitions is considerably greater than the number of 
observations of actual rating transitions, and it is in this sense that our approach adds 
information to what one could achieve using naive estimators of sovereign transition 
probabilities. 
 
The last topic we examine is how one may apply Bayesian techniques to combine the 
sovereign transition matrix estimates with the additional information supplied by 
transition matrices estimated from larger samples such as industrial obligors. The 
approach we describe is based on methods proposed in a different context, namely the 
Bayesian estimation of contingency tables. Effectively, our approach consists of taking 
weighted averages of transition matrix estimates obtained in different ways, where the 
weights are selected in a data-driven way based on a goodness of fit statistic.  
 
One may compare the techniques developed in this article with other recent work on 
estimation of rating transition matrices with few observations. Lando and Skodeberg 
apply continuous-time methods to estimate transition matrices. They effectively make 
use of the additional information provided by the time a given obligor spends in a given 
rating category. Within this framework, they show how one may estimate the transition 
intensities for the (possible non-homogeneous) Markov chain and calculate the 
corresponding discrete-time transition matrix. Typically, these matrices have non-zero 
one-year transition probabilities even for rare events such as a transition from the 
highest rating category to default. The Bayesian methods we describe above have a 
similar effect in that they tend to lead to a spread of probability weight into states that 
would otherwise have zero transition probabilities. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the ordered probit 
framework within which we model both sovereign ratings and defaults. Section 3 
provides information about our data set and examines which macroeconomic variables 
should sensibly be included in a model of sovereign credit standing. Section 4 sets out 
the probit estimation results. Section 5 discusses the transition probabilities they imply.  
Section 6 introduces some Bayesian techniques for combining different transition 
matrix estimates. Section 7 evaluates the ratings and default predictions produced by 
the model by examining how many sovereigns are correctly and incorrectly classified 
in different years on an in-sample and out-of-sample basis.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. An Ordered Probit for Ratings and Defaults 
The basic problem in estimating transition matrices for sovereigns is the relative lack of 
available data. Table 1 shows the numbers of sovereigns from different geographical 
areas and credit qualities that were rated by Standard and Poor’s at various dates since 
1981. The table demonstrates that the number of rated sovereigns has grown 
substantially over the last decade, with increases particularly in the numbers of Asian, 
Latin American and Eastern European sovereigns that have ratings. But, very few 
sovereigns have long rating histories. In 1990, only 26 sovereigns were rated of which 
only 5 were non-industrial countries. 
 
But estimating transition matrices requires large numbers of observations of rating 
transitions. Even a rating matrix for the coarse rating categories, AAA, AA, A, BBB, 
BB, B, CCC and default contains 49 elements that require estimation. If one is 
interested in finer rating categories, the number of elements to estimate is very 
considerable. For example, if one takes AAA, AA, A, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, 
BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC and default, the number of unconstrained elements to be 
estimated is 169. 
 
It is true that many of the more off-diagonal elements are likely to equal zero. But, even 
if the matrix has no more than four non-zero elements in each row, 39 entries must be 
estimated.  In the period 1981 to 1998, the number of annual observations of Standard 
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and Poor’s sovereigns ratings1 is 487 of which only 158 have ratings below single A. 
The number of annual observations of changes in ratings is 26 of which just 13 are 
changes for which the initial rating was below single A.  
 
It is therefore important to find ways of introducing other kinds of information to 
improve the transition probability estimates.  Several approaches may be taken. An 
obvious approach might be to suppose that the rating transition matrix for other, non-
sovereign obligors resembles that for sovereigns and to take a weighted average of 
estimates of both. Although this would have the advantage of simplicity, we feel there 
is too much evidence that sovereign and non-sovereign ratings behave differently to 
justify this approach. 
 
Jackson and Perraudin (2000) point out that, on average, credit spreads for sovereigns 
are distinctly lower than those of corporates with the same rating. Cantor and Packer 
(1996) show that rating agencies disagree about sovereign ratings more than they do 
about corporates. Perhaps most pertinently, Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000) show 
that sovereign rating transitions matrices differ significantly from those of US 
industrials. 
 
We therefore prefer to supplement the information contained in available data on rated 
sovereigns with information about sovereign defaults. The Export Credit Guarantee 
Department (ECGD) of the UK government supplied us with data on defaults by a 
broad set of countries. We provide more detail about this data in Section 3 but, in brief, 
using it we are able to increase the number of observations in our sample substantially 
to 1069, thereby substantially increasing the amount of information available to us in 
estimating transition matrices.2 
 
                                                 
1 By “the number of annual observations” we mean the total, summed over the different years in the 
sample, of sovereigns rated on 5th July. 
2 Our approach requires that we have no missing variables among a set of macroeconomic and financial 
regressors that we use to model credit quality. Of the1069 valid observations with no missing data, there 
are 337 annual observations of Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings of which only 131 were sub single 
A rated. The number of annual rating change observations was 21 or 11 excluding those for which the 
initial rating was less than single A. 
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The framework we employ to pool information on sovereign ratings and defaults is an 
ordered probit model. The basic assumption of this approach is that credit standing is 
driven by an index of relevant predetermined variables such as debt ratios and inflation, 
plus a normally distributed random error. The model we estimate resembles that of 
Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000).3  
 
The assumptions of the ordered probit model may be stated formally as follows (for 
more details, see Green (1997), §19.8). Suppose there are J+1 rating categories and the 
initial rating of a particular obligor is i. The terminal rating at the end of one period, j, is 
determined by the realization of a latent variable, R, in that 
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where the Zk are scalar cut-off points. It is assumed that 
εβ += XR '  
where X is a vector of predetermined variables, β is a vector of parameters and ε is 
assumed to have a standard normal distribution.  
 
Statistical implementation of this model involves the estimation of the vector of cut-off 
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are 
( )
( )
( )




−Φ−
−Φ
−Φ
=
=
=
=
+=
=
=
XZ
XZ
X
Jj
j
j
J '1
'
'
)1Prob(
)1Prob(
)0Prob(
1
β
β
β
oo
  (2) 
where 0 < Z1<…< ZJ. Given these expressions for probabilities and data on the future 
ratings of a set of obligors with an initial rating i, one may estimate the model using 
maximum likelihood techniques.  
 
                                                 
3 An alternative would have been to use the logit model employed by, for example, Demirguc and Kunt 
(1998) and Feder and Just (1977) to estimate default probabilities. 
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For many sovereigns and time periods, agency ratings are not available, however, but it 
is known whether or not the sovereign defaulted in given years. In this case, one may 
still form a likelihood for the observation in question by including the conditional 
probability that default does or does not occur, i.e., 
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By combining likelihood entries of the kind shown in equation (2) (for cases in which 
ratings are observed) with likelihood entries of the type shown in equation (3) (for 
cases in which ratings are not observed but it is known whether default took place), we 
are able to include many more countries and time periods than if we estimated the 
model solely using observations for which we have ratings. One way to characterize 
this approach is to regard the default/non-default observations as helping to pin down 
the β parameters, while the observations for which we have ratings help to determine 
the cut-off points between the rating categories (while also conveying information 
about the β’s). 
 
Once estimates of the model parameters, the Z’s and the β’s, have been obtained, one 
may predict the rating for each sovereign and each year in the sample by calculating the 
index ktX'β  (where k indicates a particular sovereign and t the time period) and noting 
the range [Zj-1,Zj] into which it falls. By this approach one may create rating histories 
for all the countries in the sample covering the entire sample period. The rating 
histories may be used to estimate rating transition matrices just as one might estimate a 
transition matrix using actual observed rating histories, by calculating the fraction of 
sovereigns initially rated i that moved to rating j within the course of one period. The 
final step is to take a weighted average of the rating transition matrix based on probit 
estimations and a naïve estimate of the rating transition matrix based simply on relative 
frequencies of transitions. 
 
3. The Data Employed 
Throughout our analysis, we use Standard and Poor’s ratings observed on 5th July of 
each year. The results would probably be similar if we used Moody’s ratings. Cantor 
and Packer (1996) note that of the 49 sovereigns rated by both Moody’s and Standard 
8 
and Poor’s in September 1995, 28 had the same rating. Of those with different ratings, 
the discrepancy was just one notch (e.g., AA- instead of Aa2) for all except 7 cases in 
which the ratings were two notches apart. 
 
The numbers of annual observations of sovereigns in different rating categories is 
shown in  Figure 1. As noted above, there are 487 annual observations of Standard and 
Poor’s sovereign ratings of which only 158 have ratings below single A. The main 
points that emerge from the figure are:  
• There are a large number of observations of high credit quality sovereigns, 
reflecting the presence in the sample of industrial country sovereigns. 
• Sovereigns in the middle of the B-range are well-represented but the high 
BBB’s and low B’s included in the sample are very few. There are almost no 
CCC’s. 
It is apparent from this that, in estimating the model, it will prove difficult to 
distinguish the BBB+/A cut-off point and that the boundaries between B, B- and CCC 
categories will be difficult to pin down.  
 
For periods in which ratings data is not available for a given sovereign, we use default 
data provided by the ECGD. Few countries have ever defaulted on public bond issues 
and hence ratings histories contain almost no observations of defaults. But, especially 
in the 1980s, many countries defaulted on their bank debt and trade credit obligations. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of defaults over time. It is notable that the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s persisted right through until the early 1990s and that only 
in 1993 was there a major reduction in defaults. 
 
The explanatory variables in our model are variables that one might reasonably expect 
would influence credit standing. Regressors are included with no lags.4 To deduce 
which variables to include, we draw on several past empirical studies. These studies 
                                                 
4 To be precise, our dependent variables are based on (i) ratings observed on July 5th of a year with date 
t, (ii) a default dummy which is unity if there was a default at any point in the year with date t, and (iii) 
explanatory variables for the year t. Explanatory variables which are stocks like debt levels are measured 
on 1st January of any given year since this is the convention followed by the provider of these data, the 
World Bank, while rates of change on flow variables such as GDP growth are rates of change from t-1 to 
t of the year average levels. 
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have examined determinants (i) of sovereign ratings (see Cantor and Packer (1996), 
Haque, Kumar, Mark and Mathieson (1996), Juttner and McCarthy (1998), Monfort 
and Mulder (2000)), (ii) of sovereign defaults (see Edwards (1984)), and (iii) of spreads 
on sovereign debt (see Burton and Inoue (1985), Edwards (1986), Cantor and Packer 
(1996), Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Min (1998), Kamin and Kleist (1999)). 
 
The variables commonly used in past studies of sovereign credit standing may be 
classified in to  
1. Liquidity variables. These variables include components of balance of payments 
that reflect a country’s short-run financing problems. Typically, they are in the 
form of ratios that proxy capital in- and outflows. The most important examples 
are (i) the debt-service-to-export ratio, (ii) the interest-service ratio (i.e., the 
ratio of interest payments to exports during a given period), and (iii) the 
liquidity gap ratio (i.e., one-year short-term debt minus current account balance 
as a ratio to available funding (capital inflows). Most empirical studies have 
found the debt-service-to-export indicator to be the most significant of the 
above indicators. 
2. Solvency variables. These are related to the liquidity variables in that they are 
intended to measure for a country’s medium to long-term ability to service its 
debt. Examples include: (i) the reserves-to-imports ratio, (ii) export fluctuations 
(usually expressed as export growth as a deviation from trend), (iii) the debt to 
GDP ratio.  
3. Macroeconomic fundamentals. These variables reflect a county’s long-run 
prospects and are used to assess the quality of a country’s government and the 
economic dynamics within an economy. Examples include: (i) the inflation rate, 
(ii) the real exchange rate, (iii) the GDP growth rate, (iv) the growth rate of 
exports.  
4. External Shocks. Variables of this kind include: (i) changes in US Treasury 
interest rates (ii) changes in the real oil price.  
 
In our choice of variables, we are most influenced by the studies of Cantor and Packer 
(1996) and Monfort and Mulder (2000). Cantor and Packer (1996) show that per capita 
income, inflation, external debt, an indicator of economic development and an indicator 
of default history all have significant coefficients in a regression of ratings (expressed 
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as a numerical index) on a range of macro variables. Their regression explains 90% of 
the variation in the ratings of 49 countries observed in 1995. 
 
Monfort and Mulder (2000) estimate an error correction model for ratings that permits 
short-run behaviour to differ from long-run relations. They argue this is consistent with 
the expressed policy of ratings agencies of rating through the cycle. In their long-run 
ratings regressions, Monfort and Mulder (2000) find all those suggested by Cantor and 
Packer (1996) are significant except for per capita income. In addition, current 
account/GDP is very significant although it has the wrong sign. Variables suggested by 
Edwards (1984) (investment/GDP) and by Haque, Kumar, Mark and Mathieson (1996) 
(terms of trade and export growth rate) are also significant. 
 
The variables we included in the most general models we estimated were: 
1. A dummy variable for past default during the sample period. 
2. A dummy variable for default in the previous year. 
3. Regional dummies. 
4. The ratio of debt service to exports. 
5. The debt to GNP ratio. 
6. The ratio of reserves to total foreign debt. 
7. The ratio of reserves to imports. 
8. The rate of consumer price inflation. 
9. The rate of GNP growth. 
10. A dummy for non-industrial countries. 
 
We were reluctant to include external shock variables since, given the twenty-year 
length of the sample period, time series variables tend to pick up trends or to act as time 
dummies. In effect, they serve to describe the sample rather than to help in forecasting. 
The variables we list seem to us a selection of the most promising liquidity and 
solvency variables and macro-factors. We focused on these variables also because they 
were all available for large numbers of countries in a consistent form on World Bank 
and IMF data CDs. Our sample period of 1981 to 1998 was dictated partly by the 
availability of this data but more importantly by the period over which we could obtain 
default data from the ECGD.  
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As well as providing guidance on the selection of explanatory variables, past studies 
have implications for the dynamic specification of the model.  Juttner and McCarthy 
(1998) argue that the findings of Cantor and Packer (1996) are not stable if one repeats 
their regression including subsequent years. The crisis year of 1998 appears to depart 
from the relationships found by Cantor and Packer (1996) substantially. Monfort and 
Mulder (2000) find that the relationship they estimate is not stable if one splits the 
sample. Variables that remain significant for all three of the sub-samples they consider 
are debt/exports, rescheduling, the fiscal balance, output growth and inflation. The R2’s 
estimated by Monfort and Mulder (2000) for Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings 
are mostly lower than the 90% found by Cantor and Packer (1996) and decline at the 
end of the sample to 50%. 
 
Monfort and Mulder (2000) stress that misclassifications of countries into different 
rating category by static models of the kind estimated by Cantor and Packer (1996) are 
serially correlated. One technique for dealing with this is to introduce lagged ratings as 
explanatory variables and this is the approach followed by Monfort and Mulder (2000). 
In our case, since we wished to generate predicted ratings running back in time to the 
start of our sample period for countries lacking agency ratings, this approach was 
difficult to implement. We therefore instead allowed for richer dynamics in the 
explanatory variables by including them lagged once as well as with no lag.  
 
4. Default Model Estimation Results 
We estimated models with the regressors listed in the last section included both as 
contemporaneous and lagged variables. We then reduced the number of variables to 
those that were highly statistically significant. The selection criterion we applied in 
variable selection was to drop variables successively that had t-statistics with absolute 
values significantly less than 2. We do not report the results of our intermediate 
estimations because of space constraints. 
 
Table 2 contains results for our preferred two models. The first model, referred to as the 
coarse rating model, includes eight ratings categories, namely AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, 
B, CCC, and default. The second model, denoted the fine rating model, includes the 
rating categories AAA, AA, A, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC, 
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and default. The explanatory variables included in both the coarse and fine rating 
models as well as a constant are: 
1. A dummy variable equal to unity if the sovereign has defaulted in the previous 
year 
2. The ratio of Debt to GNP. 
3. The ratio of foreign exchange reserves to total imports 
4. The rate of consumer price inflation. 
5. A dummy which equals unity if the sovereign is a non-industrial country and 
zero otherwise. 
6. The lagged ratio of debt service to export. 
7. Lagged consumer price inflation. 
The signs of the parameters are generally as expected. Past default, lower reserves, 
higher inflation, a higher debt to GNP ratio, being a non-industrial country and a higher 
ratio of debt service to exports all contribute to lower current credit quality. All 
variables have coefficients that are significant at conventional confidence levels. 
 
It is noticeable in the results reported in Table 2 that the parameter estimates for the 
fine rating model closely resemble those for the coarse rating model. This reflects the 
fact that the default/no default observations play the larger role in pinning down the 
estimates of the β’s.  
 
The cut-off parameters shown in Table 2 represent the square root of the gap between 
successive cut-off points. (They are squared within the estimation algorithm to preserve 
the positivity of the gap between successive cut-offs.) Since we include a constant 
among the independent variables, we normalize the first cut-off point to zero. Of the 
cut-off parameter estimates reported in the table, the most problematical are the first in 
the coarse rating model and the first two in the fine rating model. These correspond to 
the square root of the width of the CCC range in both models and to the square root of 
the width of the B- range in the fine rating model. The estimation is hampered by the 
fact that there is only a single observation of a Standard and Poor’s CCC rating in the 
sample and similarly only a single B- observation. The result is that the gaps between 
the estimated cut-off points in the sample around CCC and B poorly estimated, being 
extremely small. 
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5. Rating Transition Probabilities 
Having estimated the parameters of the coarse and fine ratings models, we are able to 
generate predicted ratings for countries for each year in the sample period. The 
approach we take in this is to allocate a sovereign to rating category j if the fitted credit 
quality index X'
∧β  (where ∧β  denotes the estimated parameter vector) lies in the 
interval [Zj-1, Zj]. Given time series for each sovereign’s rating over the sample period, 
we can then generate estimates of rating transition matrices by allowing the ijth element 
to equal the fraction of i-rated sovereigns which are rated j after one year.  
 
The results of these calculations for the coarse and the fine rating categories 
respectively are the matrices labelled “ordered probit estimates” in Table 3 and Table 6. 
In both of these tables, we also report simple, alternative estimates of the corresponding 
rating transition matrices, based solely on raw transition data (i) for sovereigns and (ii) 
for all obligors. Here, the all-obligor transition matrix is an estimate published by 
Standard and Poor’s that is calculated in the usual way by setting transition 
probabilities of moving from state i to state j equal to the relative frequencies of moving 
between these two states over a one year time period. In contrast, the sovereign matrix 
is calculated by (i) estimating the quarterly transition matrix (i.e., taking probabilities as 
equal to relative frequencies over quarterly periods) and then (ii) taking the fourth 
power of the resulting matrix to obtain an estimate of an annual transition matrix.5 
 
 In the case of the coarse ratings shown in Table 3, the probit-estimate matrix exhibits 
greater volatility of rating changes than the simple Standard and Poor’s transition 
matrix estimate in that diagonal elements of the probit-estimate matrix are generally 
smaller than those of the Standard and Poor’s matrix. This is particularly the case for 
the low rating categories such as B. Nevertheless, the estimated transition matrices are 
reasonably similar. The ordered probit estimates are more plausible in the AAA-A 
region. For example, the AA row of the matrix has entries grouped around the diagonal 
                                                 
5 This simple trick of calculating a higher frequency transition matrix and then taking powers to obtain an 
annual matrix is very close in spirit to the continuous time approach advocated by Lando and Skodeberg 
(2001). 
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in the probit model estimates while the raw Standard and Poor’s estimates include off-
diagonals entries only in positions far from the diagonal.   
 
Note that in both the probit-model matrix and the Standard and Poor’s matrix, the CCC 
transition probabilities are shown as zeros except for the probability of no rating 
change. This reflects our convention that if there are no observations in a particular 
category, we place unity in the corresponding diagonal position in the matrix. 
 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show ordered probit and Standard and Poor’s transition matrices for 
sovereign obligors and all obligors based on the fine rating category data. Again, the 
ordered probit results are broadly similar to the raw Standard and Poor’s matrix for 
sovereigns although there is again somewhat more volatility (i.e., weight on off-
diagonal entries). Again, there are problems with lowest non-default rating categories in 
that there were no observations of B- or CCC ratings.  
 
6. A Bayesian Approach to the Estimation of Transition Matrices. 
To combine information from the Standard and Poor’s estimate and the ordered probit 
estimate of transition matrices, we employ a Bayesian approach. The techniques we 
employ are related to Bayesian methods for estimating cell probabilities in contingency 
tables. As in our case, standard maximum likelihood estimators are unsatisfactory for 
estimating contingency tables since there are many cells and few observations per cell. 
Typically the empirical table seems too abrupt, and one may want to smooth the 
observed counts. 
 
Such smoothing would allow the estimator to assign non-zero one-year transition 
probabilities even if there are no transitions observed within the sample.  One could 
view the semi-parametric multiplicative hazard model used in the Lando and Skodeberg 
(2001) article as a comparable methodology. While we smooth a transition matrix their 
baseline intensity is changed via a function of a covariate.   
 
A widely used approach within the context of contingency table analysis is to employ a 
pseudo-Bayes technique, that is: (i) specify an appropriate prior and (ii) update it with a 
new estimator based on the observed data. Adapting this to the problem of estimating a 
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Markov chain transition matrix, one may write an estimator Pe based on a prior and an 
update as 
 
PQPe )1( αα −+=  .   (4) 
 
Here, Q is the prior, in our case an empirical transition matrix estimated directly from 
Standard and Poor’s data and P is the estimator we obtain using the ordered probit 
method. Since the matrix Q is itself an estimator of the true transition matrix, up-dating 
this using other information actually corresponds to a pseudo (or empirical) Bayes 
approach. 
 
The problem then reduces to one of selecting an appropriateα . In principle, there are 
three possibilities: 
(i) A global approach based on a goodness of fit 2χ statistic. 
(ii) A local approach looking at each row individually also based on goodness of fit 
statistics. 
(iii) A cross-validation procedure in which α is chosen according to minimize some 
loss functional. The idea here is to drop one observed transition at a time, 
calculate the estimator based on all data without this observation, and then 
compare the prediction of the estimator with the true observation. 
All three procedures are well established and widely used. Procedure (i) is often called 
a “testimator” because it is based on a standard goodness of fit test (see Duffy and 
Santner (1989)). Procedure (ii) is described in Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1975), 
and compared with several other approaches. Procedure (iii) is a data-intensive 
procedure (see the discussion in Hall, Sheather, Jones and Marron, (1991)) and useful 
for larger datasets.  
 
In general, Pseudo-Bayes estimators may be preferred to standard estimates because 
they have the same asymptotic performance but perform better in small samples (see 
Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland (1975)). Since the size of our data set is relatively small 
(in some cases the rating class considered has fewer than 30 observations), we prefer 
the goodness of fit procedures (i) and (ii) to the cross-validation approach, (iii), which 
tends to work better for larger data sets. Of the two goodness-of-fit procedures, (ii) 
seems preferable since it is more flexible, allowing for different weighting factors for 
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each row of the transition matrix. (In the contingency table applications for which these 
methods were originally developed, the rows and columns collectively sum to unity and 
hence one may prefer to use a global approach yielding a single weighting factor for 
prior and update. In the transition matrix case, individual rows sum to unity and one 
may well wish to treat the rows of the matrix separately.)  
 
To understand how the goodness of fit estimator (ii) works, let )(iv  denote the number 
of observations with initial rating i and let ijY  denote the number of transitions from 
rating i to rating j. The weighting factor, iα , for an individual row is then estimated by: 
∑
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Here ijq is the ijth element of the matrix Q. Note the sense in which the weights are 
chosen according to a modified goodness of fit procedure. If the prior fits the 
observations well, it will have a larger weight. 
 
The weights obtained by the above method (ii) are shown in Table 5 for the coarse 
rating categories and 9 in the case of the fine ratings. In these tables, we show the 
weighting factors that the data suggests when we use either the Standard and Poor’s 
empirical transition matrix for sovereigns or the matrix for all Standard-and-Poor’s-
rated obligors. The weights vary substantially across different rating categories, further 
justifying our choice of technique (ii) rather than (i). For some high rating categories, 
the prior fits the data so well that it receives a large weight. To construct a prior for a 
given row, we chose a row either of the sovereign or of the all-obligor matrix 
depending on which has the larger weighting factor, and then combine it with the probit 
model transition matrix using the weighted average formula given above.  
 
Even after taking weighted averages, a problem remains with our Bayesian estimates of 
transition matrices in that the CCC rating category in the case of the coarse matrices, 
and both CCC and B- in the case of fine rating matrices are absorbing states. This 
reflects our convention that placing unity in the diagonal entry when no observations 
fall into that category. The most obvious way to remove this problem and generate a 
transition matrix which we can employ in practice in credit risk modelling is to suppose 
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that the transition probabilities in the cases for which we do not observe transitions 
equal those of the naïve Standard and Poor’s sovereign transition matrix.  
 
Table 4 and 10 show the Bayesian, weighted average transition matrices for coarse and 
fine rating categories, adjusted by replacing the CCC row with a row from the Standard 
and Poor’s naïve sovereign transition matrix in the coarse rating matrix and similarly 
replacing the CCC and B- rows in the fine rating matrix. 
 
7. Evaluation of Model Performances 
Table 11 shows the ratings of all the sovereigns in our estimating data set based on the 
probit model estimates and on Standard and Poor’s data where these are available. 
There is reasonably strong association between the ratings given by the model and the 
Standard and Poor’s ratings. If one converts the fine ratings to a numerical index, the 
correlation between the fitted ratings and the Standard and Poor’s ratings for all the 
years in our sample period is 82%. Nevertheless, there are significant differences for 
some countries.   
 
To examine how well the model fits the default and ratings data, we calculated (a) how 
many of the annual observations of sovereigns were correctly classified as defaults/non-
defaults and (b) how many of the annual sovereign observations received the same 
rating from our procedure as they obtain from Standard and Poor’s.  The results of 
these calculations broken down by year are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that our model fits the default data very well. The overwhelming 
fraction of annual sovereign observations are correctly classified between the default 
and non-default categories and this is true throughout the sample period. The only 
exception was in 1993 when the model somewhat under-predicted the number of 
sovereigns that emerged from default. 
 
Figure 4 shows the number of sovereigns that are not rated by Standard and Poor’s and 
then breaks down the numbers that are rated into those which obtain the same rating 
from our procedure, and those which are rated higher and lower. The results suggest 
that our rating procedure is “unbiased” in the sense that roughly as many observations 
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receive higher ratings from our procedure that from Standard and Poor’s as those that 
receive lower ratings.  
 
Note that one should not evaluate our model by asking how well it fits the Standard and 
Poor’s ratings. Effectively, we estimate a model of actual default and then define rating 
categories broadly consistent with those employed by Standard and Poor’s. Given that 
we fit the default data rather well, the fact that there are a fairly large number of 
inconsistencies between our ratings and those of Standard and Poor’s suggests that our 
ratings may contain different but still highly relevant information about sovereign credit 
quality. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 are the equivalent of Figures 3 and 4 except that the calculations are 
performed on an out-of-sample rather than an in-sample basis. By out-of-sample, we 
mean that to calculate the number of correctly classified observations in a particular 
year, we re-estimate the ordered probit model excluding data from that year and then 
use the resulting model to forecast what category the year-t observations should be in. 
This approach is in the spirit of the “leave-one-out method” discussed by Hand (1997). 
 
Figure 5 shows that even on an out-of-sample basis, the model still fits the default data 
rather well and indeed there is very little difference between Figures 3 and 5. Figure 6 
on the other hand, does appear somewhat different from Figure 4 in that the ratings 
produced by the model are more conservative in the period up to and including 1998. 
While one might suggest that this represents a bias in the way in which the model is 
benchmarked against the Standard and Poor’s ratings, it is probably equally reasonable 
to argue that the model out-performed Standard and Poor’s in this period since it gave 
more conservative results just prior to the Asian and Russian crises. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper describes how one may improve upon raw estimates of rating transition 
matrices for Standard and Poor’s rated sovereigns by estimating a simultaneous ordered 
probit model of sovereign rating and default experience. Since data on sovereign 
defaults is available for a larger group of countries and over a considerably longer 
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period than is sovereign rating data, this approach adds a significant amount of 
information about sovereign credit quality. 
 
Given estimates of transition matrices based on our ordered probit model, we show how 
these may be combined with information in rating transition matrices calculated in a 
more conventional way from the wider population of Standard and Poor’s ratings 
histories. Formally, our approach of combining information represents an empirical or 
quasi-Bayesian procedure. We employ data-driven techniques for choosing appropriate 
weighting factors between our sovereign transition matrix estimate, one based on raw 
Standard and Poor’s transition data and one based on transition data for all Standard 
and Poor’s-rated obligors. We include a comparison of the ratings (and thus default 
probabilities) implied by our model with those attributed to different sovereigns by 
Standard and Poor’s. 
 
Our analysis of the goodness of fit of our model to the default and ratings data suggests 
that it correctly classifies sovereigns as in default or not in default in an accurate 
fashion. The ratings produced by the model are benchmarked against the Standard and 
Poor’s ratings in an unbiased fashion except at the end of the sample period when the 
agency ratings were probably insufficiently conservative about sovereign risk in the run 
up to the Asian and Russian crises. 
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Table 1 Number of sovereigns rated by Standard & Poor’s 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Investment Grade 12 12 11 12 12 12 12 12 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 25 25 23 
Non-Investment Grade 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 6 11 15 19 22 33 39 
                   
Industrial Countries 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
EM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 5 8 13 17 21 26 37 41 
    Asia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 6 8 8 9 11 13 13 
    Latin America 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 7 9 12 14 
    Eastern Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 5 9 10 
    Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 
    Atlantic Ocean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  Note: ratings are measured on 5th July of each year. 
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Table 2 Estimation Results 
 Coarse Fine 
Parameters Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Constant 1.054 0.129 1.034 0.127 
Previous Year Default Dummy -2.751 0.271 -2.668 0.260 
Debt to GNP -2.451 0.374 -2.388 0.362 
Reserves to Imports 2.673 0.974 2.608 0.969 
Inflation -1.925 0.587 -1.833 0.570 
Dummy for Non-Industrial Countries -2.244 0.260 -2.277 0.259 
Lagged Debt Service to Export -2.503 0.666 -2.317 0.646 
Lagged Inflation -0.640 0.354 -0.663 0.351 
Cut-off point 1 0.001 0.146 0.002 0.072 
Cut-off point 2 0.683 0.075 -0.001 0.125 
Cut-off point 3 1.105 0.062 0.342 0.084 
Cut-off point 4 0.893 0.063 0.603 0.076 
Cut-off point 5 1.130 0.084 0.626 0.068 
Cut-off point 6 1.174 0.066 0.504 0.065 
Cut-off point 7   0.705 0.061 
Cut-off point 8   0.708 0.063 
Cut-off point 9   0.440 0.071 
Cut-off point 10   0.308 0.076 
Cut-off point 11   1.129 0.084 
Cut-off point 12   1.172 0.066 
Average log likelihood       -11.527          -11.629 
Number of cases           1069             1069 
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Table 3 Transition Matrices with Eight Rating Categories 
Ordered Probit Model Estimates 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.978 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.077 0.897 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.019 0.808 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.798 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.005 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.776 0.078 0.000 0.041 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.327 0.367 0.000 0.306 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
CC / D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.050 0.032 0.000 0.896 
S&P Sovereign Transition Matrix 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.969 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.006 0.977 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.030 0.939 0.020 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.926 0.024 0.017 0.000 0.000 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.057 0.885 0.056 0.001 0.000 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.063 0.886 0.031 0.018 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.066 0.241 0.693 
CC / D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.169 0.003 0.823 
S&P Transition Matrix for All Rated Obligors 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.926 0.068 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.006 0.918 0.068 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
A 0.001 0.024 0.918 0.050 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.003 0.054 0.885 0.046 0.009 0.001 0.002 
BB 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.071 0.823 0.079 0.011 0.010 
B 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.060 0.832 0.039 0.058 
CCC 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.018 0.106 0.616 0.243 
CC / D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 4  Adjusted Weighted Average Transition Matrices with Eight Rating 
Categories 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.972 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.049 0.906 0.042 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.020 0.828 0.151 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.805 0.143 0.001 0.000 0.005 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.097 0.788 0.078 0.003 0.033 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.317 0.385 0.001 0.297 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.066 0.241 0.693 
CC / D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.048 0.031 0.000 0.900 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Weights for Bayesian Estimation of Fine Rating Transition Matrix 
 AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC / D 
When prior is Standard and Poor’s-rated sovereign transition matrix 
 0.656 0.293 0.129 0.049 0.085 0.031 1.000 0.026 
When prior is the transition matrix for all Standard and Poor’s-rated obligors 
 0.060 0.399 0.181 0.083 0.251 0.037 1.000 0.045 
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Table 6 Ordered Probit Model Estimate of Transition Matrix with Fourteen Rating Categories 
 AAA AA AA BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.971 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.105 0.868 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.020 0.800 0.100 0.060 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB+ 0.000 0.000 0.417 0.333 0.083 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.103 0.410 0.385 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB- 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.100 0.687 0.167 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
BB+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.172 0.621 0.097 0.034 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.034 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.410 0.205 0.256 0.051 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.026 
BB- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.196 0.464 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 
B+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.087 0.239 0.326 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.261 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.500 
B- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
CC /D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.007 0.032 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.896 
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Table 7 S&P Sovereign Transition Matrix 
 AAA AA AA BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.969 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.006 0.977 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.030 0.940 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB+ 0.000 0.002 0.181 0.697 0.057 0.060 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.129 0.714 0.118 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB- 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.098 0.827 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BB+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.117 0.815 0.059 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.027 0.070 0.855 0.023 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BB- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.055 0.030 0.751 0.148 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001 
B+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.027 0.027 0.048 0.718 0.096 0.028 0.034 0.020 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.200 0.727 0.055 0.006 0.001 
B- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.088 0.804 0.062 0.037 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.241 0.693 
CC /D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.163 0.006 0.824 
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Table 8 S&P All Obligor Transition Matrix 
 AAA AA AA BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.926 0.068 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.010 0.926 0.056 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.001 0.024 0.913 0.036 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB+ 0.000 0.003 0.107 0.764 0.081 0.027 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 
BBB 0.001 0.002 0.036 0.074 0.786 0.053 0.023 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 
BBB- 0.000 0.004 0.014 0.024 0.089 0.747 0.058 0.033 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
BB+ 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.034 0.127 0.680 0.053 0.042 0.019 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.006 
BB 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.015 0.047 0.071 0.720 0.069 0.032 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.010 
BB- 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.036 0.083 0.705 0.086 0.029 0.014 0.014 0.013 
B+ 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.019 0.056 0.774 0.062 0.024 0.020 0.030 
B 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.021 0.074 0.686 0.044 0.054 0.095 
B- 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.045 0.069 0.641 0.107 0.118 
CCC 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.023 0.042 0.041 0.616 0.243 
CC /D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 9 Weights for Bayesian Estimation of Fine Rating Transition Matrix 
AAA AA A BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC/D 
When prior is Standard and Poor’s-rated sovereign transition matrix 
0.981 0.219 0.182 0.221 0.093 0.082 0.080 0.030 0.094 0.059 0.200 1.000 1.000 0.020 
When prior is transition matrix for all Standard and Poor’s-rated obligors 
0.102 0.314 0.263 0.159 0.063 0.165 0.303 0.042 0.118 0.052 0.252 1.000 1.000 0.051 
 
Table 10 Weighted and Adjusted Transition Matrix 
 AAA AA AA BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC / D 
AAA 0.969 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AA 0.075 0.887 0.036 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A 0.000 0.021 0.830 0.083 0.048 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB+ 0.000 0.001 0.365 0.414 0.078 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.105 0.439 0.360 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BBB- 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.098 0.697 0.149 0.017 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.006 
BB+ 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.159 0.639 0.083 0.037 0.025 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.026 
BB 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.027 0.396 0.227 0.248 0.050 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.025 
BB- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.051 0.183 0.493 0.199 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.064 
B+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.083 0.228 0.349 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.247 
B 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.143 0.422 0.011 0.014 0.398 
B- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.088 0.804 0.062 0.037 
CCC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.241 0.693 
CC /D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.007 0.031 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.901 
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Table 11 End of sample period ratings, average rating in the 1990 
Country Names End of Sample Period Ratings Average Ratings in the 90's 
  Year Our Model S&P Average Our Model S&P 
Algeria 1998 BB . . CCC to B- . 
Argentina 1998 BB BB BB B to B+ BB- to BB 
Australia 1998 AAA AA AA to AAA AAA AA 
Austria 1998 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Bangladesh 1998 BBB- . . BBB- . 
Barbados 1998 BBB+ . . BBB- to BBB . 
Belize 1998 BBB- . . BBB- to BBB . 
Bolivia 1998 CC/D . . CC/D . 
Botswana 1998 A . . A . 
Brazil 1998 BB BB- BB- to BB CCC to B- B+ 
Bulgaria 1998 CC/D . . CC/D . 
Cameroon 1997 CC/D . . CC/D . 
Chile 1998 BBB- A BBB to BBB+ BB to BB+ BBB+ to A 
Colombia 1998 BB+ BBB- BB+ to BBB- BB to BB+ BBB- 
Costa Rica 1998 BBB- BB BB+ B- to B . 
Croatia, Republic of 1998 BBB- BBB- BBB- B to B+ BBB- 
Czech Republic 1998 BBB- A BBB to BBB+ BBB- to BBB BBB+ to A 
Denmark 1998 AAA AA AA to AAA AAA AA 
Dominican Republic 1998 BBB B+ BB to BB+ B- to B B+ 
Ecuador 1998 CC/D . . CCC to B- . 
Egypt, Arab Republic of 1998 BBB BBB- BBB- to BBB B+ to BB- BBB- 
El Salvador 1998 A BB BBB- to BBB BB to BB+ BB 
Estonia, Republic of 1998 A BBB+ BBB+ to A BBB to BBB+ . 
Finland 1998 AA AA AA AA to AAA AA to AAA 
Germany 1998 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Ghana 1998 CC/D . . CCC to B- . 
Hungary 1998 BB- BBB- BB to BB+ B to B+ BB+ to BBB-
Iceland 1998 AA A A to AA AA A 
India 1998 BBB- BB+ BB+ to BBB- BBB- BB+ 
Indonesia 1998 CC/D CCC CC/SD to CCC BB- to BB BBB- to BBB
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1982 A . . . . 
Jamaica 1998 BB+ . . B+ to BB- . 
Japan 1990 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Jordan 1998 B+ BB- B+ to BB- CC/SD to CCC B+ to BB- 
Kazakhstan, Republic of 1998 BBB BB- BB+ B+ BB- 
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Korea, Republic of 1998 BBB- BB+ BB+ to BBB- BBB+ to A A to AA 
Latvia, Republic of 1998 A BBB BBB+ BBB to BBB+ BBB 
Lesotho 1998 BB+ . . BBB- . 
Lithuania, Republic of 1998 A BBB- BBB to BBB+ BB to BB+ BBB- 
Malaysia 1998 BB+ A BBB BBB- to BBB A 
Maldives 1998 BBB- . . BB+ to BBB- . 
Mauritius 1998 BB+ . . BBB- to BBB . 
Mexico 1998 BB+ BB BB to BB+ B to B+ BB to BB+ 
Moldova, Republic of 1998 BB+ . . BB+ to BBB- . 
Mongolia 1998 BB . . B to B+ . 
Morocco 1998 BB+ BB BB to BB+ B- to B . 
New Zealand 1998 AAA AA AA to AAA AA to AAA AA 
Nigeria 1998 BB+ . . CC/SD to CCC . 
Norway 1998 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Pakistan 1998 BB B- B+ BB to BB+ B+ 
Panama 1998 BB BB+ BB to BB+ CC/D BB+ 
Papua New Guinea 1998 BB- . . BB- to BB . 
Paraguay 1998 BBB+ BB- BB+ to BBB- BBB- to BBB BB- 
Peru 1998 CC/D BB B CC/D . 
Philippines 1998 BB+ BB+ BB+ B to B+ BB- to BB 
Poland, Republic of 1998 BBB BBB- BBB- to BBB B- BB+ to BBB-
Romania 1998 BB B+ BB- B+ to BB- BB- 
Seychelles 1998 BBB . . BBB to BBB+ . 
Slovak Republic 1998 BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- to BBB BBB- 
South Africa 1998 BBB BB+ BBB- BBB+ to A BB to BB+ 
Spain 1998 AA AA AA AA to AAA AA 
Sri Lanka 1998 BBB- . . BB to BB+ . 
Thailand 1998 BB BBB- BB+ BB+ to BBB- A 
Trinidad and Tobago 1997 BBB- BB+ BB+ to BBB- B to B+ BB+ 
Tunisia 1998 BB+ BBB- BB+ to BBB- BB to BB+ BBB- 
Turkey 1998 B+ B B to B+ B to B+ BB- to BB 
United Kingdom 1998 AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA 
Uruguay 1998 BBB- BBB- BBB- B to B+ BB+ to BBB-
Venezuela 1998 BB B+ BB- B- to B B+ to BB- 
Zambia 1998 CC/D . . CC/D . 
Zimbabwe 1998 B+ . . BB- to BB . 
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 Figure 1 Number of Observations (Sovereign-Years) in Each Rating Category 
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Figure 2 The Number of Sovereigns in Default (based on ECGD Data) 
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Figure 3 Annual Sovereign Observations of Defaults and Non-defaults 
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Figure 4 Annual Sovereign Observations of Coarse Ratings 
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Figure 5 Annual Sovereign Observations of Defaults and Non-defaults (Out-of-
Sample) 
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Figure 6 Annual Sovereign Observations of Coarse Ratings (Out-of-Sample) 
 
